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This article springs from the claim that representations of mundane human life are just as 
prominent as nova in contemporary sf, and that through their generative interplay the genre 
figures ‘a transient dreamscape for visitation by the (post)human mind, via which the reader 
gains an expanded perception of not only their own empirical environment, but also of 
posthuman possibility’ (Hay 2019: 31). The presence of the quotidian in sf confirms the 
capacity of the (post)human mind to transcend the presumptions of traditional humanism. By 
deconstructing the rhetorical role of nova in Duncan Jones’s Source Code (2011), I 
demonstrate that the novel content of sf fades intratextually, just as nova within the genre 
tend towards entropy intertextually; an accumulative process I shall term novum decay.  
 This thesis problematises the popular notion that genre sf constitutes a linear, self-
referencing schema, or ‘megatext’ (Brooke-Rose 2010: 243), which purportedly ‘works by 
embedding each new work, [...] as a self-structuring web of non-mundane signifiers and 
syntagms, in an even vaster web of interpenetrating semantic and tropic givens or vectors’ 
(Broderick 1995: 59). For Damien Broderick and others, sf’s rhetorical components are 
exclusively comprised by nova. Yet, as Joanna Russ demonstrates, the proliferation of the sf 
genre itself invariably precipitates the intertextual ‘phenomenon of genre material wearing 
out’ (Russ 2007: 221), since nova cannot remain novel in a genre where their imaginative 
content is depreciated by overuse. This article accordingly expands upon Russ’s premise by 
challenging the centrality of the novum to Darko Suvin’s model of cognitive estrangement, 
and demonstrating its intratextual instability.  
 In Metamorphoses of Science Fiction (1979), Suvin famously theorizes that sf texts 
are fundamentally defined by their capacity to produce cognition of the unknown through the 
 
deployment of estranging nova. Suvin proposes that the novum is ‘always codetermined by 
the unique’, enabling it to delimit ‘relations basically new and unknown in the author’s 
environment’, and he accordingly extrapolates that the sf genre has an implicitly utopian 
political character (Suvin 1980: 64). ‘The Suvin Event’, as Gerry Canavan terms the seismic 
effect of his critical intervention, ‘has framed four subsequent decades of work in the field’ 
(Canavan 2016: xii). Much like Donald Wollheim’s teleological claim that sf ‘speaks of an 
infinite range that is open to humanity in the universe’ (Wollheim 1971: 117), Suvin’s 
seminal theory of sf is premised upon the assumption that the genre’s megatext proceeds 
towards the telos of ‘the destiny of humanity’ (Suvin and Angenot 1988: 13).  
 In a contemporary context, however, Suvin’s eschatological emphasis upon the 
novum as the centralising literary device of the sf genre is both outdated and overly 
prescriptive. Since the Suvinian paradigm assumes that all sf is ‘essentially about grand 
narratives of science’ (Keen 2019: 14), it valorises a model of human exceptionalism. Yet, 
since the start of the twenty-first century, the ‘concept of “human” has been broadly 
challenged, while “posthuman” and “transhuman” have become terms of philosophical and 
scientific enquiry’ (Ferrando 2019: 21). Given the extensive challenge to the term ‘human’ by 
posthumanist thinkers such as Francesca Ferrando, N. Katherine Hayles and Rosi Braidotti, it 
is necessary to reconsider the extent to which Suvin’s humanistic appraisal is still pertinent to 
contemporary sf.  
 
The Novum 
It remains widely accepted within sf criticism that novelty is the defining feature of the genre. 
For example, it has been variously argued that sf is reliant upon ‘the critical power’ of the 
novum (Rieder 2017: 4); that the genre ‘literally distances the traveller from the familiar’ 
(Seed 1995: x); that sf proves ‘that we need not and should not settle for the familiar 
 
contingencies of everyday existence’ (Freedman 2009: 70); that the genre ‘depends on 
novelty’ (Shippey 2016: 27); and that it ‘invoke[s] a phenomenological world distinct from 
the quotidian environment’ of the reader (Cline 2014: 252). To challenge the assumption that 
sf is implicitly ‘humanistic’ (Suvin and Angenot 1988: 45), it is crucial to problematize the 
category of the novum itself so as to generate a post-humanistic conception of the genre.  
 To that end, a number of critics have questioned the centralising role the novum plays 
within the model of cognitive estrangement. China Miéville, for instance, asserts that ‘the 
cognition effect’ is no more than an act of ‘persuasion’ in which the reader willingly 
succumbs to the rhetorical skill of the author rather than the scientific accuracy of the novum 
(Miéville 2009: 238). For Miéville, Suvin’s scientistic usage of the novum is not only a 
mystification but also ideological; it nostalgically echoes ‘a strangely prelapsarian, often 
instrumentalised, science and bureaucratic rationality’ (240). By contrast, Istvan Csicsery-
Ronay proposes that in the hypercapitalist milieu of the twenty-first century the ‘emergence 
of novums has accelerated to the point that they matter not just to academic philosophers and 
futurologists, but to people pursuing their everyday tasks’ (Csicsery-Ronay 2011: 58). He 
therefore suggests that ‘the novum, far from being at the front line of humanistic history, 
becomes an ironic model of quotidian reality’ (59) when it appears within contemporary 
works of sf. Likewise, Rhys Williams concludes that sf ‘is no longer capable of estranging us 
from the hegemonic discourse for which it operates as ideological cheerleader. It is limited 
[...] by an orientation towards alterity articulated through an idealized imaginary of capitalist 
enlightenment and progress’ (Williams 2014: 626).  
Despite the insightfulness of these criticisms, the conclusion that sf’s novel content 
has become intractably conservative as a result of its alliance to a grand narrative of 
technological, scientific and capitalist modernity is greatly reductive. Far from decentring the 
novum, such a criticism continues to privilege its defining role within the genre, albeit from a 
 
negative perspective. What is required instead is an expanded understanding of sf’s rhetorical 
strategies that may make sense of why it retains its popularity within contemporary media. 
This is especially the case when so many of the technologies that sf once fantasized have now 
become ubiquitous, even banal, realities. At the same time, as once fantastical devices 
become pervasive aspects of our lived realities, so as human beings we increasingly interact 
with technology in an interstitial territory that can be best regarded as ‘(post)human’ (Hayles 
1999: 246). 
 Hence, whilst the repetitive, mundane or banal aspects of (post)human life are often a 
substantial aspect of realist texts, in works of contemporary sf these quotidian elements have 
a specialized function and are fundamental to the genre’s drive toward cognition of that 
which is presently alien. Whereas Suvin states that ‘the boredom of a nine-to-five drudgery 
relieved [only] by flashes of TV commercials’ (Suvin 1980: 24) is anathema to sf, it is 
precisely this type of social lethargy that necessarily underlies contemporary sf’s nova in 
order to focalize its posthuman impulse. Despite (or even because of) the perpetual anxiety of 
obsolescence, sf relies on the perpetual ‘invention of new living metaphors that redescribe 
metaphor’ and ‘allow a new conceptual production to be grafted onto the metaphorical 
production itself’ (Ricoeur 1994: 294). However, whereas for Paul Ricoeur metaphor is vital 
‘by virtue of the fact that it introduces the spark of imagination’ (303), in sf, this spark has a 
finite lifespan. Since any novel defamiliarization is ultimately unsustainable, every novum 
the genre proposes is subject to decay, such that this process has become central to the 
production of new sf. 
 
Novum Decay 
The nova of sf texts are fundamentally unstable, decaying both intratextually and 
intertextually, an assertion which is underpinned by recent cognitive research. In a number of 
 
scientific studies, researchers have used functional magnetic resonance imaging technologies 
to measure the activation areas present within the brain during the activity of reading. In one 
such study, ‘metaphor processing selectively activate[s] sensory areas in the modality from 
which the metaphors primarily derived their meaning’ (Lacey et al 2012: 418), which for the 
reading of sf suggests that the reader’s ability to cognitively engage with sfnal nova must 
necessarily be grounded in their understanding of familiar, mundane phenomena. In addition, 
‘the familiarity of sentences can affect speed and accuracy of processing’ (Desai et al 2011: 
2378), including familiarity with a given metaphor: 
The target is understood in terms of the base domain through motoric 
simulations, which gradually become less detailed while still maintaining their 
roots in the base domain. The negative correlation of primary motor areas with 
metaphor familiarity and the activation of secondary motor regions for 
metaphors regardless of familiarity suggest a gradual abstraction rather than a 
switch in the processing mode. (2384) 
These findings suggest that readers’ cognition of metaphors depends upon ‘a gradual 
abstraction process, whereby relatively detailed simulations are used for understanding 
unfamiliar metaphors’ but ‘these simulations become less detailed and involve only 
secondary regions as the familiarity increases’ (2385).  
 Thus, when an sf work deploys a novum, the arresting metaphoricity of that novum 
invariably fades, from the moment at which the reader is able to cognitively comprehend its 
novel content in relation to his/her own reality, while the estranging quality of the novum also 
proportionately diminishes. The reader gradually approaches cognizance of the novum and, 
particularly in the case of texts where mundane signifiers are explicitly deployed alongside 
nova, the otherwise mundane elements function as a catalyst to the cognitive process which 
facilitates the reader’s increasing comprehension of the sfnal elements. 
 
 Therefore, in accordance with Viktor Shklovsky’s assertation that defamiliarization 
functions to ‘transfer the usual perception of an object into the sphere of new perception’ 
(Shklovsky 2004: 19), textual representations of the mundane elements of the reader’s 
lifeworld become crucial sfnal devices in themselves. Accordingly, alongside sf’s 
proliferation into the everyday cultural sphere and its attendant emergence as a mainstream 
genre, the diegetic worlds of many texts within contemporary sf have become increasingly 
saturated by mundane realism. This turn is conversant with but significantly broadens the 
scope of Geoff Ryman’s ‘Mundane Manifesto’ (2007), which presumes that the genre’s banal 
elements entirely reside within sf texts set exclusively ‘on Earth’ (Ryman 2007). Observably, 
a vast range of contemporary sf works regularly utilize mundane elements in order to 
facilitate their readers’ cognitive engagement, and therefore gesture towards the (post)human 
character of the contemporary Western lifeworld.  
 As David Roden states, since human ‘technologies are intrinsically functionally 
indeterminate and multistable’ (Roden 2015: 159), our highly technologized lifeworld has 
become sufficiently everyday in its own terms, despite its immense range of technical 
complexities. Thus, many contemporary sf texts implicate their audiences in consideration of 
the potentiality of their posthuman futures by evoking the banality of their technological 
present in novel terms. The phenomenological process by which nova decay in the minds of 




The opening panorama of Source Code is an extensive aerial shot, which portrays a cityscape 
indistinguishable from that of many contemporary US cities. Clearly, the film’s setting is not 
intended to be immediately defamiliarizing, and so initially, its near-future depiction of 
 
(post)human life is far more symptomatic of films within the realist tradition than it is sfnal. 
The pedestrian nature of the opening sequence of Source Code bears resonance with William 
Gibson’s assertation that despite cyberspace having been the paramount novum of his Sprawl 
Trilogy, it has become just ‘another part of the city’ (Paikin) since the advent of real-life 
digitality. As Gibson emphasises, the reader’s relation towards the novelty which cyberspace 
originally encompassed has now been redefined by ‘its ubiquity and the absolute quotidian 
banality of much of what [...] we do with it’ (Paikin) in everyday life. Veronica Hollinger 
echoes Gibson’s assertion when she states that ‘the present has already been invaded by the 
future, has already become the stuff of science fiction’ (Hollinger 2008: 246).  
 Correspondingly, Source Code’s opening draws a contrast between the routine 
familiarity of Chicago’s cityscape, and the considerable posthuman morphology that it 
encloses on closer inspection. By presenting a multitude of cars, metal buildings and a train 
from an abnormal viewpoint, the aerial shot renders individual (post)humans invisible, 
offering a perspective from which we appear to be mechanical or technological entities rather 
than biological beings. This forced perspective implies that our species’ interface with 
modern technology is extensive enough that ‘the contours of our own extended bodies’ can, 
in pragmatic terms, be ‘found in our technologies’ (Kozel 2007: 99). Source Code’s opening 
sequence therefore suggests that the periphery of the interface between our species and 
technology has blurred into indistinctness in the contemporary world, to the extent that the 
human/technology dualism is rendered invalid. 
 Through its mundane mise en scène, the film attains a defamiliarizing effect that 
exposes the already significantly posthuman nature of contemporary everyday life. As the 
opening of Source Code implies, the technological embeddedness of our species is already 
demonstrable in empirical terms. To take a related example, when walking, ‘pedestrians 
[alter] their visual search behaviour and adaptive gait when using their phone compared to no 
 
phone being present’ (Timmis et al 2017: 17), which is also ‘consistent with adopting an 
increasingly cautious stepping strategy which may serve to reduce the risk of tripping/falling’ 
(17-18). As such, our species’ interaction with mobile phones has over the course of forty 
years engendered an empirically demonstrable adjustment to the manner in which we have 
walked for millennia.  
 This finding draws a fruitful parallel with Hayles’s suggestion that the co-constitutive 
relationship between our species and technology comprises ‘a co-evolutionary spiral in which 
what we ma[k]e and what we bec[o]me’ (Hayles 1999: 164) have become intractably 
intertwined. Furthermore, as proponents of substantivist theories of technology propose, 
technologies are non-neutral objects, and so the nature of our species metamorphoses in 
parallel with technological developments, since technologies ‘are more than bundles of 
internal or external functions. They are materialized potentialities for generating new 
functions as well as modifiable strategies for integrating and reintegrating functions’ (Roden 
2015: 162). Indeed, we have reached the point where we cannot do without technologies; 
they are too firmly embedded in our everyday lives. We can therefore no longer be we 
without they, and hence the figure of the human has arguably been irreparably ruptured. 
 The indistinctness of the periphery between (post)humans and technology is made 
particularly apparent when Colter Stevens (Jake Gyllenhaal) wakes on what appears to be a 
train. Although the film’s narrative opens in medias res on an ostensibly pedestrian train 
journey, Stevens’s wide-eyed survey of his environment reveals that it is entirely unfamiliar 
to him, and that he has no residual memory of getting on board. Although puzzled about his 
amnesia, he continues to ride the train as it travels through the city streets of Chicago. The 
film’s visual rhetoric remains entirely absent of sfnal elements up until the point at which its 
first scene culminates with the train unexpectedly exploding in a giant fireball, at which point 
the mundane essence of its setting is inexorably shattered. As soon becomes apparent, the 
 
prior realist plausibility of what appeared to be a train journey is actually fabricated by a 
novum within the diegetic world.  
 The train is the centrepiece of a simulated iterative environment – the eponymous 
Source Code – within which Stevens’s consciousness has already been immersed for an 
indeterminate amount of time. The train’s mundane setting therefore becomes sfnal each time 
subsequent iterations of the same simulation appear in the narrative, even as the Source 
Code’s novel qualities become familiar to the viewer via its characteristically iterative role as 
a novum. Additionally, it is implied that Stevens’s amnesia is a result of his mind having 
been wiped after numerous permutations of the same journey, in order that he experiences it 
afresh. As his forgetting of prior iterations of the Source Code simulation is akin to the 
cognitive phenomenon of habitualization towards the repetitive and/or everyday, his plight is 
analogous to a Western audience’s own habitualization towards their technologized 
lifeworlds. 
 The film’s eponymous novum is therefore neither novel nor mundane, but rather 
simultaneously novel and mundane. As its pseudoscientific rationalization within the film 
reveals, the Source Code technology co-opts a short-term memory track that briefly survives 
the brain’s necrosis to create the virtual environment that Stevens recurrently finds himself 
within. Although its nature could easily be misconstrued, the ‘Source Code is not time travel, 
rather [...] time reassignment’ (Jones 2011), and de facto time travel remains as impossible in 
the film’s diegetic world as it does in our own.  
 The Source Code is a governmentally developed and financed technology, utilized by 
a team of secret service operatives to mine the experiential data Stevens gleans from his 
recursive immersion within the memory track of a passenger killed in an act of terrorism, so 
as to prevent a subsequent attack. He is repeatedly re-immersed within the simulation until he 
succeeds in discovering the data that allows the US government to prevent the violent 
 
disturbance to everyday life that the second attack would otherwise comprise. Crucially then, 
although the Source Code qualifies as a novum in the Suvinian paradigm – as it distinguishes 
the film’s diegetic world from our own – its technological novelty is deployed for a 
considerably pedestrian and bureaucratic purpose, and it has no broader impact on the lives of 
the (post)humans of the film’s diegesis than maintaining political and social hegemony. 
Later, Stevens regains consciousness in what appears to be his corporeal body, and 
finds himself strapped to a chair in a dark room. Source Code’s operators explain to him that 
he ‘will have eight minutes, same as last time’ in his next immersion in the simulation. As the 
first narrated iteration of Stevens’s death occurred less than seven minutes into the film, a 
considerable portion of his interaction with the Source Code during that iteration has been 
elided, so that there exists a rudimentary disparity between the film’s plot and narrative.  
The transition of Stevens’s consciousness back into the realm of the Source Code is 
narrated by means of a shot of a quacking duck flying over a lake, replicated verbatim from 
the first narrated iteration. Whilst on board the train, the minutiae of his journey unfold in 
exactly the same manner that they did before; a passenger spills her coffee as she passes in 
the aisle; a ticket collector checks Stevens’ ticket; and one commuter clumsily knocks a pile 
of papers out of the hand of another. The prominence of mundane components within the 
Source Code simulation facilitates a phenomenological dialectic between the audience’s 
lifeworld and the film’s. Additionally, the verbatim replication of events in the narrative 
attenuates the novelty of the Source Code novum from the viewers’ own perspectives. By 
implying that our everyday lifeworld is constantly encroaching into the realms of sf, the over-
representation of the (post)human quotidian within the film links the sf world firmly back to 




Stevens experiences severe cognitive dissonance when he is returned to the simulation, and 
cannot compartmentalize the fact that he is experiencing a sequence of events which he has 
experienced before. He thereby proposes that ‘It’s the same train, but it’s different’, his 
desperate proclamation tacitly echoing Jacques Derrida’s assertion that that which ‘resonates 
like an old repetition [...] was already, but in an altogether different way’ (Derrida 2006: 15). 
Stevens spends the second narrated iteration under the conviction that the mundane facade of 
the simulation is ‘a distraction’ (Jones 2011) from his mission of locating the bomb, thereby 
upsetting his avatar’s colleague Christina (Michelle Monaghan).  
 By Source Code’s third narrated iteration, however, Stevens has come to recognize 
that each new permutation of the simulation encloses a reality equally as veritable as its 
preceding ones, despite their ostensible similitude and corresponding lack of verisimilitude. 
This time, he begins by setting a timer on his avatar’s watch; moves his foot away quickly 
enough that it does not get coffee spilt on it; produces his train ticket promptly; and entices 
Christina to detail the backgrounds of the commuters that she and his avatar regularly travel 
to work with. Through practice, he not only learns the sequence of events that transpire 
within the memory track but also how to manipulate his recursive experience in a manner 
conducive to his mission. Likewise, the film’s viewers have now seen three iterations of the 
memory track within the Source Code novum, so that they are gradually habituated to its 
novelty. 
 As Hayles emphasizes, (post)humans regularly ‘participate in systems whose total 
cognitive capacity exceeds our individual knowledge’, and yet ‘are capable of more 
sophisticated cognition than cavemen not because modern humans are smarter [...] but 
because they have constructed smarter environments in which to work’ (Hayles 1999: 289). 
Our (post)human situation is accordingly an emergent phenomenon actualized by our 
creation of technologies which collectively surpass the limits of our individual intellects, and 
 
the technological capacity of our species has cumulatively become greater than could be 
assumed by the sum of its component entities.  
 Therefore, the process of successfully navigating the technologized Western lifeworld 
is managed by means of the individual’s phenomenological ability to cognitively become 
habituated towards a manifold variety of technologies that they are unable to understand. We 
may, for instance, use a microwave several times a week, but the majority of us would be 
clueless as to how to build one from scratch. When Stevens starts to manipulate the memory 
track’s simulation, he demonstrates that the novelty of the Source Code has begun to decay 
from his phenomenological perspective, and yet crucially, the audience’s own 
phenomenological perspective is implicated in the concomitant task of imaginatively 
assimilating the sfnal aspect of Source Code’s eponymous novum. 
 Concordantly, the subjective and phenomenological nature of the audience’s 
perception of the mundane aspects of their own lifeworld comprises a vital, intratextual 
component of novum decay. Although the Source Code is inaugurated as a novum at the start 
of the film, by the time its sixth and seventh observed iterations occur, they are reported in a 
massively elided form, and comprise less than ten seconds of its narrative apiece. The 
rendering of these later iterations assumes that the viewer has, by this point, become 
habituated to the idiosyncrasies of the recursive Source Code simulation, and hence, they will 
already have effectively assimilated its posthuman novelty. By the time he undertakes the 
final iteration of the simulation, Stevens has become resolutely habituated to the Source 
Code. During the span of this final iteration, he not only manages to locate and detain the 
terrorist, but also has time to woo Christina, make peace with his father and hire a comedian 
aboard the train to perform a set. Stevens’s rapport with the technology means he is able to 
achieve an outcome that not only meets but also exceeds the scope of his narrowly defined 
assignment. 
 
 Alan Wall states that metaphors become exhausted when they have ‘become so 
predictable that all the original defamiliarization has vanished. Then the metaphor has 
become a cliché and something new is needed to replace it’ (Wall 2009: 33). His definition of 
metaphor as an inherently transient textual device seems especially tenable when applied to 
the schema of contemporary sf texts such as Source Code. Although discrete nova undergo 
novum decay intratextually, this only emphasizes that the posthuman drive of sf functions 
intertextually and cumulatively, so that ‘the rapid exhaustion of a metaphor means that great 
progress is being made’ (Jones and Wall 2009: 101). As is true for the Source Code, sf texts 
deploy nova which become less novel as their narratives progress until, entropically, their 
defamiliarizing effect on the reader has been exhausted.  
 
The Everyday 
Nova inexorably decay throughout individual sf texts to become what Shippey refers to as 
‘the datum’, ‘a discrete fact stated or implied in the passage’ (Shippey 2008: 12); ‘nearly all 
science fiction works have not one but many nova [...] just as any paragraph of any non-
science fiction work will contain much data’ (Shippey 2016: 27). Data is immediately 
explicable to the reader and produces no defamiliarizing effect whatsoever. Although 
Shippey asserts that there exists a predilection towards nova rather than data in the sf genre, 
the two elements are concurrently extant and engaged within a complex dialectical accord. 
Whereas nova assert the significance of posthuman possibility, data stipulate the extent to 
which the prospective is embedded within the (post)human material present. The co-
constitutive dialectic that exists between nova and data indicates the spuriousness of 
deterministic assessments of sf as an extended metaphor of linear technological progress. 
 Whilst the generative interplay between decaying nova and bare data maintains the 
functionality of the genre’s posthuman drive, it simultaneously precipitates the fact that sf 
 
texts cannot establish nova which are too far removed from the technological horizon of the 
society which conditioned their textual production. As Fredric Jameson asserts, since total or 
radical otherness ‘encourages visions of the far future in which we will have lost almost 
everything that makes us identifiable to ourselves’ (Jameson 2005: 174), any depiction of true 
otherness within an sf text would necessarily be incomprehensible. Hence, representations of 
the audience’s everyday lifeworld form an indispensable cognitive connection between the 
currently known and the posthuman aspect of sf.  
 Although in Source Code Stevens’s decision to repeatedly enter the memory track is 
motivated by his desire to terminate the iterative cycle he is trapped within, he does 
eventually succeed and is rewarded accordingly. His release from recursive servitude within 
the simulation is cathartic and allows him to fulfil the film’s ‘heteronarrative’ (Roof 1996: 
108) by winning Christina’s affections – an ending symptomatic of Judith Roof’s assertion 
that protagonists in sf texts who are characterized by multiplicity must eventually be ‘reduced 
to manageable singularity’ (78). Yet, crucially, the text’s eucatastrophe is brought about by 
Stevens’s choice to remain a part of the simulation, drawing a drastically posthumane 
resolution to the film since, in the final instance, ‘instead of seeking the release of death, he 
begins to pursue the possibility of a life somehow within Source Code, or within a parallel 
universe enabled by it’ (Wright, 2018: 81). 
Whilst the multiple use of close-up shots of cameras throughout the film foregrounds 
the ubiquity which technology already holds in our world, and echoes fears that ‘our 
machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert’ (Haraway 2017: 309), 
Source Code’s conclusion confirms that our future is enhanced just as much as it is 
threatened by our technological interaction. As this analysis has suggested, the figuration of 
repetition as a narrative element in modern sf transcends the didactic and totalitarian role by 
which repetitive schema often codified twentieth century dystopias. The repetitive schema of 
 
Source Code does not in the final instance embody the dystopic by eschewing characters’ 
agency, but instead typifies a more nuanced figuration which suggests that the utopian is 
achievable through our everyday (post)human lives.  
This is apparent in the manner by which Stevens gradually learns to accept the truths 
of his technologized lifeworld as he manipulates the memory track he encounters in the 
Source Code more and more skilfully, before eventually choosing to continue his existence 
within it. Likewise, although our increasing engagement with technology and virtuality 
indicates a significant paradigm shift in our recorded history, our (post)human perceptions of 
what comprises our subjective everyday lifeworlds will continue to morph alongside our 
interaction with initially novel technologies.  
 As Roden argues, ‘whatever kinds of bodies or minds posthumans may have, they 
will have to be discursively situated agents practically engaged within a common life-world’ 
(Roden 2015: 75). In this light, mundanity is – rather antithetically – the most posthuman 
article a given sf text may represent. As our (post)human condition can only be sufficiently 
understood through a bifocal lens which considers the contemporary world and our past 
heritage in aggregate, the predominance of novum decay in modern sf demonstrates the ways 
in which ‘humanity’ is always already becoming posthuman. Thus, the quotidian or repetitive 
elements of contemporary sf provide a recognizable and fundamentally (post)human 
foundation, from which the genre’s novelties are able to depart with radical intention to form 
its overarching imaginative, visionary drive. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has demonstrated that, contrary to Suvin’s model of cognitive estrangement, 
banality does not merely form an ancillary feature of contemporary sf, but rather, comprises a 
vital component of it. If our ‘vision of the imagination, [can be] both enlarged and subtly, 
 
somberly transformed’ (Alter 1978: 217) by great works of art, the manner by which sf texts 
expand the collective posthuman imagination through the process of novum decay is a hugely 
significant literary and cultural undertaking. Meanwhile, the sf genre maintains its axiological 
sensation of conveyed newness through the continual publication of new texts, so that its 
imaginative horizons develop continually in synergy with the concomitant development of 
(post)humanity.  
 Although Rita Felski is not discussing sf when she states that everyday life ‘is, 
indisputably: the essential, taken-for-granted continuum of mundane activities that frames our 
forays into more esoteric or exotic worlds’ (Felski 2000: 77), she astutely conjectures the 
evocative quality which mundanity actualises in dialogue with novelty within contemporary 
sf. As has been demonstrated, when nova decay in sf texts, the posthuman-imaginative aspect 
of those texts becomes familiar, and their novelty becomes phenomenologically contingent. 
The presence of novum decay within the genre therefore de-emphasizes eschatological 
readings of sf, and emphasises the posthuman potential enclosed by the possibility of 
development beyond the imaginative horizons which condition any given work of sf. 
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